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“May You Stay Forever Young”:
Robert Sadoff and the History of
Mental Disability Law
Michael L. Perlin, JD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 33:236–44, 2005
I am honored to have been asked to participate in
the symposium honoring Bob Sadoff. He has been
one of my closest friends for over 30 years and has
been an inspiration to me at every stage of my
career. I was especially gratified that I was asked to
speak about the history and development of men-
tal disability law, in large part because of Bob’s (to
a great extent, unknown) influence on that devel-
opment. I hope that this article, based on my
speech, helps to illuminate that influence and to
make the connection explicit.
I was a rookie public defender in Trenton, New
Jersey, in December 1971 when I first met Bob.
He was, at the time, the immediate past-President
of the American Academy for Psychiatry and the
Law (AAPL). I was 25 and he was 35. He had
agreed to serve as an expert witness in an insanity-
defense case of mine, in which my client had
stabbed his treating psychiatrist in the neck—a
fact that had made many forensic witnesses reluc-
tant to involve themselves in the case. After this
initial experience, Bob became an unofficial advi-
sor to me, and he was my first “go-to guy” when I
needed to consult someone who could offer me
wisdom about the global matters that involve the
criminal trial process and defendants with serious
mental disabilities.
Within months of my meeting Bob, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Jackson v. Indiana,1 in
which it ruled that
. . .[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the pur-
pose for which the individual is committed [Ref. 1, p 738],
and that
. . .a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial
cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time neces-
sary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future [Ref. 1, p
738].
By its decision, the Supreme Court in Jackson, per
Justice Blackmun, created modern mental health
law.
When I first read Jackson, I thought instantly of
the clients I had been representing fruitlessly at the
Vroom Building (New Jersey’s maximum security
facility for the “criminally insane”)—individuals
who had been institutionalized, some for 5, 10, or 15
years, without a hearing and without a trial. Jackson
appeared to give me hope, but how to apply it?2 How
could I convince the bored trial judges who sat on
these cases weekly to implement Jackson? Bob was in
my office one day while I was mulling all this over,
and he said to me (after I explained my frustration),
“So, why don’t you file a class action?” What I have
never told Bob before is that his suggestion set in
motion a course of events that would eventually
change the history of mental health law across the
nation.
I listened to Bob and filed Dixon v. Cahill to im-
plement Jackson, the first case in the nation to do so,
and the mental health world literally changed. When
the dust cleared, the court ruled that the indefinite
incarceration of individuals in the Vroom Building
violated Jackson and ordered individual hearings for
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each inmate.3 This was in 1973, and we quickly dis-
covered cases of individuals who had been awaiting
trial since 1963, 1953, 1948, and, in one case, 1928!4
The courts ultimately found that 185 of our 225
clients were illegally detained (Bob testified in many
of their remand cases over the next year or so), and
Dixon received international publicity.
It also led New Jersey’s Governor-elect, Brendan
Byrne, to create, as part of the newly established New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, a Divi-
sion of Mental Health Advocacy, specifically em-
powered to represent individuals on all matters re-
lated to their commitment to, retention in, and
release from psychiatric hospitals.5 An argument can
be made that, with the creation of the New Jersey
Division of Mental Health Advocacy, in an opera-
tional sense, modern mental health law was born.
Certainly, there is no question that the Division of
Mental Health Advocacy served as the impetus for
the late Federal Mental Health Systems Act of 1980,6
the predecessor of the Protection and Advocacy for
Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 2000, which insured
the presence of some sort of legal services office for
persons with mental disabilities in every state.7
Now, if that sounds a bit self-serving, I’m certainly
willing to back off from that position a bit and say
that there were several other “birth moments” of
mental health law that must be considered. First, as
already stated, was the decision in Jackson. Second,
and perhaps equally important, was the decision in
the Alabama case of Wyatt v. Stickney,8 both as it
transformed institutional mental health law and how
it reflected the courage of Federal District Court
Judge Frank Johnson, who made it clear that, for the
purposes of the due process clause, institutionalized
persons with mental disabilities were simply human
beings (Ref. 3, § 3A-3,1, at 25–6, n 161). Third was
the influence—both through his legal opinions and
his other writings—of Federal District Court Judge
David Bazelon, who, it has been said, “invited the
world of mental health professionals and criminolo-
gists into his courtroom” and “extended his court-
room back into the world.”9 I will address all of these,
but I am convinced that, when we look, not at the
headlines and the hoopla, but at the lives of the tens
and hundreds of thousands of unknown, faceless,
nameless persons institutionalized because of mental
illness, the sea of change that led to the creation of
specialized and organized legal services offices em-
powered to represent such persons was the true birth
of modern mental health law.
When I was a law student (in the late 1960s), the
course in Psychiatry and the Law mostly covered the
legal regulation of psychiatric practice. There was
some discussion of Baxstrom v. Herold10 (the case in
which the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a
New York statute that authorized, through adminis-
trative decision, the civil commitment of mentally ill,
sentence-expiring convicts and their continued con-
finement in a maximum-security mental institution
operated by the Department of Corrections without
benefit of a jury trial) and some conversation about
theoretical arguments to abolish the insanity de-
fense.11 By and large, though, the course was about
how the law treats psychiatrists (on questions such as
privilege and confidentiality, tort liability, and licen-
sure). Once Jackson v. Indiana was decided, and once
Wyatt v. Stickney was decided, and once mental
health advocacy offices were created, something very
different—something called “mental disability
law”—was created. And that is the focus of this
article.
There are an infinite number of ways in which we
can categorize modern mental health law, but, for the
purposes of this article, I am going to discuss these
three broad categories: civil commitment, right to
treatment, and right to refuse treatment. When we
think about the categories that I have listed, there are
two filters through which all of these developments
must be read: the availability of adequate counsel and
the availability of adequate expert assistance. For, just
as I believe that none of modern mental health law
could have developed as it has without the presence
of organized, trained counsel, I also believe that none
of it could have developed as it has without the col-
laboration and cooperation of forensic mental health
professionals such as Bob Sadoff, whose fingerprints
are on just about all the important litigation in this
area.
Let me turn to the categories I have enumerated.
Involuntary Civil Commitment
The Supreme Court’s first two modern mental
health law decisions—Jackson in 1972 and O’Connor
v. Donaldson12 in 1975—and the federal district
court case of Lessard v. Schmidt13 (first decided in
1971) established the template for all involuntary
civil commitment law. First, as I have already indi-
cated, Jackson incorporated the due process clause
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into all commitment decision-making, by finding
that the “nature and duration” of commitment were
constitutionally bounded, which meant that both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the com-
mitment power had to be subjected to the constitu-
tional lens. Especially important was the Jackson
case’s “cue bid” to lawyers, urging them to bring
more such cases to the Court. Justice Blackmun
noted: “Considering the number of persons affected,
it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive consti-
tutional limitations on this power have not been
more frequently litigated (Ref. 1, p 737).
The importance of this announcement—that the
courts were open and ready for more business—
cannot be underestimated or overstated.
Next, the decision in O’Connor—finding a consti-
tutional “right to liberty” of those who were not dan-
gerous and “could survive safely in freedom”—made
it clear that a “need-of-treatment” standard was not
constitutionally permissible. And finally, the multi-
textured Lessard decision—applying a dangerousness
standard for commitment and establishing a panoply
of procedural rights at the commitment hearing (in-
cluding, but not limited to, the right to notice, the
right to a statement of reasons precedent to commit-
ment, the right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the applicability of the rules of
evidence)—began to connect the dots in a way that is
still, in most jurisdictions, good law today (Ref. 3,
vol. 1, § 2A-4.4a, at 126–33 (2d ed. 1998)). Perhaps
most important of all, the Lessard court constitution-
alized the right to the “least restrictive alternative,”
endorsing Judge Bazelon’s decision in Lake v. Cam-
eron (364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966))14:
We believe that the person recommending full-time involun-
tary hospitalization must bear the burden of proving (1) what
alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated;
and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suit-
able. These alternatives include voluntary or court-ordered out-
patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment
in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or relative,
placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental
health clinic, and home health aide services [Ref. 13, p 1096].
To a great extent, all individual decision-making
in involuntary civil commitment cases flows from the
invocation in Lessard of Judge Bazelon’s decision in
Lake.15 And, although there did not appear to have
been any forensic witnesses before the Lessard court,
the court did rely heavily on the expertise of psychi-
atrists, quoting Dr. Sherman Kieffer, Director, Na-
tional Center for Mental Health Services, Training
and Research, St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Washington,
D.C., who had recently testified before Congress that
“most mental illness can be treated more effectively
when detected and diagnosed early and properly, and
when the positive relationships between the individ-
ual and his family, his job, and his community are
not severed” (Ref. 13, p 1087 n 10).
The vast bulk of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
this area of the law in the past 30 years have dealt with
what I call “special populations” (juveniles,16 prison-
ers,17 voluntary patients,18 persons with mental re-
tardation,19 sexually violent predators20,21), the one
important exception being the Court’s 1979 decision
in Addington v. Texas,22 establishing an intermediate
“clear and convincing” evidence standard as the bur-
den-of-proof quantum in commitment cases. Add-
ington is historically important for several reasons:
● It reflects how the court truly sees commitment
cases as different in important ways from both
civil cases (which are basically just about
money), and from criminal cases (which are in-
spired by a need to punish).
● It reflects the core value of the Burger Court
(one that the Rehnquist Court has passively ac-
cepted): there may be a dispute about whether a
person facing civil commitment is dangerous,
but there is no question that any such person is,
at the least, mentally ill (an assumption, by the
way, that does not reflect the database of indi-
vidual case law at all).
● It reflects the assumption—perhaps based on a
fact not in evidence—that persons committed to
mental hospitals get some sort of treatment that
makes them ultimately more mentally healthy
than they would have been had they not been
institutionalized.23
This snapshot is an incomplete one for many rea-
sons: the Supreme Court has never decided an out-
patient commitment case (and there is no Lessard-
type case from the states or the intermediate federal
courts that rises to a Lessard-type level on that impor-
tant question), nor has it decided cases involving
temporary or emergency commitments. Even more
important, the central legal question in involuntary
civil commitment that has never been considered by
the Supreme Court (or by any other court in other
than the most cursory and conclusory way) is the
extent to which a patient’s invocation of his or her
constitutional right to refuse treatment (more about
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this later) can be used as evidence to support invol-
untary commitment (a dilemma that raises profound
philosophical, constitutional, and social questions,
but one that has completely evaded the Supreme
Court’s radar screen).24
One final word on the commitment process.
When I discuss this in lectures, I frequently get skep-
tical glances from audience members who are quick
to tell me how the question of commitment is no
longer important, and how, since hospital popula-
tions have plummeted, this was a problem that was
fixed in the 1970s. Simply put, they are wrong. More
than 227,000 individuals remain institutionalized in
inpatient psychiatric hospitals, more than 5 million
are admitted to such facilities each year, and thou-
sands of involuntary civil commitment cases are still
contested annually.25 Moreover, there is great intra-
jurisdictional disparity in the use of the process. By
way of example, a recent survey found that, in Phil-
adelphia County, 3,000 civil commitment hearings
occur each year, while in Allegheny County 8,000
occur each year.26
Granted, most of the individuals in question are
institutionalized for days or weeks and not months or
years (though there still are thousands of chronic
patients who will, no doubt, spend the remainder of
their days “behind the walls of Red Wing” (this is
both an obscure allusion in a Bob Dylan song and a
slightly less obscure Minnesota allusion).27 This
diminution of census is irrelevant to the mental
health law question that has remained on the table
since the Jackson decision in 1972: to what extent
does the due process clause authentically and mean-
ingfully apply to those facing commitment? This is a
question that still has not been answered.
One final thought on this area of the law. Bob and
I wrote an article together in 1982 entitled “Ethical
Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the
Commitment Process.”28 In it, we argued that there
are matters of ethics that the lawyer and the expert
witness must consider in the civil commitment pro-
cess. Sometimes, things take a while to percolate. In
2001, in a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, In the
Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.F.,29 the Montana
Supreme Court relied on state statutory and consti-
tutional sources to find that:
. . .[T]he right to counsel. . .provides an individual subject to an
involuntary commitment proceeding the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. In turn, this right affords the individual with
the right to raise the allegation of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in challenging a commitment order [Ref. 29, p 491].
In assessing what constitutes effectiveness, the
court—startlingly, to my mind— eschewed the
Strickland v. Washington standard30 (used to assess
effectiveness in criminal cases) as insufficiently pro-
tective of the “liberty interests of individuals such as
K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law,
but who. . .must indefinitely bear the badge of infe-
riority of a once ‘involuntarily committed’ person
with a proven mental disorder” (Ref. 29, p 491). The
court, in an interesting conclusion, stated that “rea-
sonable professional assistance” (Ref. 30, p 689)—
the linchpin of criminal procedure decisions in this
area of the law—“cannot be presumed in a proceed-
ing that routinely accepts—and even requires—an
unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and
generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation”
(Ref. 29, p 492).
In assessing the contours of effective assistance of
counsel, the court emphasized that it was not limit-
ing its inquiry to courtroom performance. Even
more important was counsel’s “failure to fully inves-
tigate and comprehend a patient’s circumstances
prior to an involuntary civil commitment hearing or
trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical decision-
making between counsel and client as to how best to
proceed.” Such prehearing matters, the court contin-
ued, “clearly involve effective preparation prior to a
hearing or trial” (Ref. 29, p 492). The court further
stressed state laws guaranteeing the patient’s “dignity
and personal integrity” (Ref. 29, p 493) and “privacy
and dignity” as a basis for its decision. “[Q]uality
counsel provides the most likely way—perhaps the
only likely way—to ensure the due process protec-
tion of dignity and privacy interests in cases such as
the one at bar” (Ref. 29, p 494).31
To bring this part of the discussion full circle,
modern and mature mental health law could not
have developed as it has had there not been forensic
psychiatrists such as Bob Sadoff, taking seriously the
role of the lawyer and the role of the expert at the
individual civil commitment hearing.
The Right to Treatment
The second aspect of mental disability law I want
to address is the right to treatment. Again, it traces its
lineage to two cases: Jackson (recall the “nature. . .of
commitment” line; Ref. 1, p 738) and Wyatt v. Stick-
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ney, the first case to apply the U.S. Constitution to
the conditions of hospital confinement (Ref. 8, p
784). Of course, as I will stress in a minute, the
spiritual predecessor of Wyatt was Judge Bazelon’s
decision in Rouse v. Cameron.32
First, some history. By 1960, social reformers had
become a major voice in the call to restructure state
public mental hospitals. The president of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association called the facilities
“bankrupt beyond remedy” (Ref. 33, p 7). The social
critic Albert Deutsch testified before Congress re-
garding his earlier investigations of state hospitals
with these chilling words:
Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals
of nearby piggeries were better housed, fed and treated than
many of the patients on their wards. I saw hundreds of sick
people shackled, strapped, straitjacketed, and bound to their
beds. I saw mental patients forced to eat meals with their hands
because there were not enough spoons and other tableware to go
around—not because they couldn’t be trusted to eat like hu-
mans. . . . I found evidence of physical brutality, but that paled
into insignificance when compared with the excruciating suffer-
ing stemming from prolonged, enforced idleness, herdlike
crowding, lack of privacy, depersonalization, and the overall
atmosphere of neglect. The fault lay. . .with the general com-
munity that not only tolerated but enforced these subhuman
conditions through financial penury, ignorance, fear and indif-
ference [Ref. 34, pp 40–2].
At about the same time, Morton Birnbaum (a
physician and attorney) published his seminal article
in the ABA Journal calling for a declaration of “the
recognition and enforcement of the legal right of a
mentally ill inmate of a public mental institution to
adequate medical treatment for his mental illness”
(Ref. 35, p 499) and for courts to consider openly the
question of whether “the institutionalized mentally
ill person receives adequate medical treatment so that
he may regain his health, and therefore his liberty, as
soon as possible” (Ref. 35, p 502). Birnbaum located
the constitutional basis of this right to treatment in
the due process clause: “Substantive due process of
law does not allow a mentally ill person who has
committed no crime to be deprived of his liberty by
indefinitely institutionalizing him in a mental
prison” (Ref. 35, pp 502–3). This article was widely
acknowledged as “supplying much of the theoretical
support for the subsequent development of the right-
to-treatment litigation” (Ref. 25, p 98).
The existence of a statutory right to treatment had
first been judicially recognized by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals in the unlikely set-
ting of a habeas corpus case brought by an insanity
acquittee. In Rouse v. Cameron, the court—per, of
course, Judge Bazelon—found that a District of Co-
lumbia hospitalization law established such a statu-
tory right, reasoning that “the purpose of involuntary
hospitalization is treatment, not punishment,” quot-
ing a statement by the act’s sponsor that when a
person is deprived of liberty because of need for treat-
ment, and that treatment is not supplied, such depri-
vation is “tantamount to a denial of due process.”
The hospital thus needed to demonstrate that it had
made a “bona fide effort” to “cure or improve” the
patient, that inquiries into the patient’s needs and
conditions be renewed periodically, and that the pro-
gram provided be suited to the patient’s “particular
needs” (Ref. 32, p 455).
Rouse was the subject of considerable academic
and scholarly commentary—most of which was fa-
vorable—but was nonetheless criticized sharply by
the American Psychiatric Association for interfering
with medical practice: “The definition of treatment
and the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for med-
ical determination” (Ref. 36, p 1458). This position,
to be sure, was not unanimously held by the psychi-
atric establishment, but it provides a context through
which some of the incessant criticisms of the mental
health advocacy movement can be reexamined: that
the trade association for the service providers most
closely linked with inpatient mental health care took
the position that the hands-off doctrine required a
policy of judicial nonintervention in the relationship
between institutionalization and constitutional
rights.
The most important case finding a constitutional
right to treatment was, without doubt, Wyatt v. Stick-
ney.37 Wyatt was clear:
The purposes of involuntary hospitalization for treatment pur-
poses is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment.
This is the only justification from a constitutional standpoint,
that allows civil commitment to [a state hospital]. . . . To de-
prive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and
then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very funda-
mentals of due process [Ref. 8, pp 784–5].
It subsequently found three “fundamental condi-
tions for adequate and effective treatment”: (1) a hu-
mane psychological and physical environment, (2)
qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer
adequate treatment, and (3) individualized treat-
ment plans (Ref. 8, 344 F.Supp., p 390). Following a
hearing (to which the court had invited a broad cross
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section of interested professional associations to par-
ticipate), the court issued supplemental orders detail-
ing the “medical and constitutional minimums-
. . .mandatory for a constitutionally acceptable
minimum treatment program” (Ref. 8, 344 F.Supp.,
p 376). These standards covered the full range of
hospital conditions, including environmental stan-
dards, civil rights, medical treatment criteria, staff
qualifications, nutritional requirements, and the
need for compliance with life safety code provisions.
As has been well documented, the course of right-
to-treatment litigation changed significantly after the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Youngberg v.
Romeo.38 Although the Court acknowledged that in-
stitutionalized persons retain certain constitutional
rights—to food, shelter, clothing, and medical
care—it stopped short of finding a constitutional
right to treatment (Ref. 38, pp 315–17). The failure
of the Court to endorse a robust right to treatment in
Youngberg led— unfortunately, in my view—to a
slow and steady cessation of constitutional litigation
in this area of the law—a cessation abetted, I am sure,
by the recognition on the part of plaintiffs’ lawyers
that states frequently do not live up to their ends of
the bargains when they enter into consent decrees in
constitutional cases. It was not, in fact, until 2000—
nearly 30 years after Judge Johnson’s first epochal
decision—that the final consent decree was entered,
and the state fully complied with the court’s order.39
I believe, however, that the Court’s tepid decision in
Youngberg—and its articulation of a nearly impossi-
ble-to-fail “substantial professional judgment” test in
that case (Ref. 38, p 323)—is the primary culprit.
Having said this, I do not want to conclude this
section on this note. I believe it is important to con-
sider the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead
v. L.C.40 Olmstead qualifiedly affirmed an Eleventh
Circuit decision that had ruled that the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) entitled plaintiffs (resi-
dents of Georgia Regional Hospital, Augusta, GA) to
treatment in an integrated community setting, as op-
posed to an “unnecessarily segregated” state hospital
(Ref. 40, p 597). In writing the majority opinion,
Justice Ginsburg stressed that “unjustified isolatio-
n. . .is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability,” and ordered that states be required to
maintain “a comprehensive, effectively working plan
for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities
in less restrictive settings” (Ref. 40, pp 605–6). As
written, Olmstead has the potential to infuse new life
in the right-to-treatment body of law, but on a stat-
utory, rather than on a constitutional, basis, through
its explicit endorsement of the ADA’s “integration
mandate.” Implementation of Olmstead has been
spotty (a condition that I have bemoaned in a series
of law review articles14,15,41,42), but I am persuaded
that the right to treatment will develop with new and
creative constructions of the ADA.
The Right to Refuse Treatment
The matter of the right to refuse antipsychotic
medication remains the most important and volatile
aspect of the legal regulation of mental health prac-
tice. It raises questions about the autonomy of insti-
tutionalized mentally disabled individuals to refuse
the imposition of treatment that is designed (at least
in part) to ameliorate their symptomatology, the de-
gree to which individuals subjected to such drugging
are in danger of the development of irreversible neu-
rological side effects, the evanescence of terms such as
“informed consent” or “competency,” and the prac-
tical and administrative considerations of imple-
menting such a right in an institutional setting.
These questions mark the litigation that has led to
the articulation of the right to refuse treatment as “a
turning point in institutional psychiatry” and “the
most controversial issue in forensic psychiatry to-
day.”43 Perhaps the most compelling issues raised by
the right to refuse antipsychotic medication are the
potential infringement of individuals’ constitutional
rights, including the First Amendment rights to pri-
vacy and mentation, the Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial, the Eighth Amendment right to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Four-
teenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. Given
the multiplicity and gravity of the issues involved in
these cases, their significance frequently transcends
the narrow focus of a “mental disability law” case.
The conceptual, social, moral, legal, and medical
difficulties inherent in the articulation of a coherent
doctrine on the right to refuse treatment have been
made even more complicated by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reluctance to confront most of the underly-
ing issues in cases arising in civil settings. As a result
of the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Mills v.
Rogers44 to sidestep the core constitutional questions
and its concomitant articulation of the doctrine that
a state is always free to grant more rights under its
constitution than might be minimally mandated by
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the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal Constitu-
tion, two parallel sets of cases have emerged.
In one, state courts have generally entered broad
decrees in accordance with an expanded due process
model, in which the right to refuse treatment has
been read broadly and elaborately, generally inter-
preting procedural due process protections liberally
on behalf of the complaining patient. These cases
have frequently mandated premedication judicial
hearings and heavily relied on social science data fo-
cusing on the potential impact of drug side effects,
especially tardive dyskinesia. In the other, federal
courts have generally entered more narrow decrees in
accordance with a limited due process model. These
provided narrower administrative review and re-
jected broad readings of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s substantive and procedural due process pro-
tections, relying less on social science data (which
were frequently ignored or dismissed as part of an
incomprehensible system allegedly beyond the
courts’ self-professed limited competency). In gen-
eral (but not always), the state cases involved civil
patients; more frequently, the federal cases dealt with
individuals originally institutionalized because of in-
volvement in the criminal trial process.45
This division became somewhat more hazy, how-
ever, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 de-
cision in Riggins v. Nevada.46 Riggins reversed a death
sentence in the case of a competent insanity-defense
pleader who sought to refuse the administration of
antipsychotic medications during the pendency of
his trial—the Court finding a violation of the defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial. In Riggins, although the
Court did not set down a bright-line test articulating
the state’s burden in sustaining forced drugging of a
detainee at trial, it found that this burden would be
met had the state demonstrated medical appropriate-
ness and, either (1) considering less intrusive alterna-
tives, that antipsychotic drugs were “essential for the
sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others”; or
(2) a lack of less intrusive means by which to obtain
an adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence
(Ref. 46, p 135).
Most recently, in 2003, the Supreme Court re-
turned to this topic—again in a criminal law con-
text—and decided Sell v. United States,47 a case in-
volving the government’s right to medicate an
incompetent defendant to make him competent to
stand trial. After finding that the defendant had a
liberty interest in avoiding the involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs, and this interest was
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause against all but “essential” or “overriding” state
interests (Ref. 47, p 2182) the Court held that:
The Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to ad-
minister antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges to render that defendant competent to
stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine
the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive
alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important gov-
ernmental trial-related interests [Ref. 47, p 2183].
What Sell and Riggins—and to a lesser extent, the
Supreme Court’s 1990 prison drugging decision in
Washington v. Harper (establishing a limited due pro-
cess right in the case of convicted prisoners who wish
to refuse medication)48—tell us is that the game, for
all practical purposes, is over. When read together,
these three cases make it clear that a qualified right to
refuse medication is located in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, that the pervasive-
ness of side effects is a key factor in the determination
of the scope of the right, that the state bears a con-
siderable burden in medicating a patient over objec-
tion, and that the “least restrictive alternative” mode
of analysis must be applied to right-to-refuse cases.43
Although the Supreme Court’s only decisions in this
area of the law in the past 20 years have come in the
criminal context, it is a losing argument to suggest
that civil patients somehow have fewer rights. In-
deed, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Mills v. Rogers44 in 1982, every state high
court that has considered this question has ruled that
there is such a right.
Irony time. Recall that, when I was discussing the
involuntary civil commitment process, I pointed out
an irresoluble dilemma: that it is the decision by pa-
tients facing commitment to invoke this constitu-
tional right to refuse that is frequently interposed as
the reason that civil commitment should be ordered.
As I have said, although there are many individual
commitment cases that show this, the anomaly itself
has never been the topic of subsequent litigation. I
hope, in the post-Sell universe, that such litigation
will be undertaken.
Conclusions
As I wrote this article, I reflected back on my 13
years as a “real” lawyer, before I became a full-time
academic (I was a deputy public defender in Tren-
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ton, New Jersey, from 1971 to 1974; Director of the
New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy
from 1974 to 1982; and Special Counsel to the New
Jersey Public Advocate from 1982 to 1984). I
thought about my work with Bob—not just on the
Vroom Building cases and the individual insanity
and incompetency cases I mentioned at the begin-
ning of the paper, but in all aspects of mental disabil-
ity law.
When I was with the New Jersey Division of Men-
tal Health Advocacy, we filed Doe v. Klein, a Wyatt-
type case seeking to enforce a constitutional right to
treatment at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital in
Morristown, New Jersey. After the case was settled,49
we created a monitoring committee, and, of course,
Bob was the forensic psychiatrist chosen for that
committee. During his work in that position, Bob
brought to our attention drugging practices that
were, to say the least, extraordinarily troubling.
These insights turned into the decision to investigate
drugging practices more comprehensively, which led
us to file Rennie v. Klein,50 one of the first two class
action cases brought in federal courts as a constitu-
tional challenge of the institutional drugging poli-
cies. Bob had also served as one of the experts in Scott
v. Plante,51 the Third Circuit’s predecessor to Rennie.
In short, as I said at the beginning, Bob’s fingerprints
are all over the development of mental health law in
New Jersey, and, by incorporation, throughout the
United States.
Out of curiosity, I did a simple WESTLAW search
for “Dr. Robert Sadoff ” or “Dr. Robert L. Sadoff ” in
the ALLCASES database, and came up with 99 re-
ported appellate cases in which Bob had testified. I
scanned the cases quickly: they included criminal,52
tort,53 civil rights,54 attorney misconduct,55, adop-
tion,56 employment discrimination,57 jail and prison
conditions,58 judicial misconduct,59 and institu-
tional rights (including, as I have just indicated, cases
of the right to treatment and the right to refuse treat-
ment).51 These cases range from the very obscure to
the very famous, to the very, very famous.60 When
you read them, you realize the connection—the tight
connection—between Bob Sadoff and the history of
mental disability law (the areas that I have discussed
in depth, as well as the others). So, what more fitting
venue for an article about the history of this area of
the law than in the Journal issue about the program
that honored Bob?
I conclude by thanking Bob for coming to Tren-
ton that snowy morning 33 years ago. You
changed my life. You changed all of our lives. You
changed the world. In the words of my other favorite
Minnesota native, “May you stay forever young.”61
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